



## Democratic Attitudes in Ukraine

*This study was conducted by GfK Hungary in the framework of the project titled “Democratic Consciousness in Central-European Identity and Differences between the Visegrad countries and Ukraine”.*

*The project was supported by the International Visegrad Fund.*





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## 1. Introduction

During the previous year, Ukraine has been at the center of the international community's attention due to the outburst of the Euromaidan protests and the military conflict between Kyiv and the allegedly Russia-backed separatist movements in the country's Eastern regions. This ongoing crisis is fueled by many factors: the economic and political orientation of Ukraine towards Russia or Europe, ethnic conflict, corruption, energy, military aggression, and other key forces." Although the recent discourse is dominated by the military conflict, the democratization discourse should not be put aside, since it has been shown that democratization can ease these kinds of conflicts. For example, in Macedonia the Horrid Agreement provided successful resolution to its own ethnic conflict through municipal decentralization. Therefore, the democratization of Ukraine is highly relevant in order to ensure peace. Moreover, it is important for the Visegrad countries to have a democratic neighbor with a stable economy and political system, which's territorial sovereignty and integrity is guaranteed and remains inviolable.

In this paper the subjective side of democratic consolidation is observed. The development of democracy does not only require institutionalization of democracy, but it also highly depends on the democratic values of the citizens, whose active participation is crucial. Widespread democratic attitudes have the ability to reduce authoritarian ambitions. Whereas, existing nostalgia for an authoritarian regime may make headway for dictatorship. Furthermore, several political scientists pointed out that the stakeholders have a better understanding of where the problem lies in their political system. As Mills has argued citizens know where the "democratic shoe pinches". (Mills noted by Logan and Mattes 2010: 4) Therefore analyzing public opinion about democracy is highly relevant to current policy.

In the first section democratic attitudes are introduced according to two aspects. Firstly, (1) this paper compares Ukrainian citizens' democratic values to public opinion in the Visegrad countries. These four countries share similar historical backgrounds. Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and the V4 (Visegrad four) were

transformed into satellite states, therefore, both of them still bear the traces of the communist dictatorship. However, the differences before state socialism and the diverse trajectories of the post-socialist transformation caused deep differences between these countries in terms of democratization. In addition to the international comparison, the (2) tendencies of the population over time are also observed. Therefore this paper examines how Ukrainians' opinion on the issue of democracy has changed in the last decades.

To sum up, we can say that the *support of democracy* in Ukraine does not lag behind the Visegrad countries due to rapid Ukrainian development. However, the rate of people who think that *democracy can effectively address* the issues that their countries face is less in Ukraine than in the reference countries. Moreover, *satisfaction with democracy* is also much lower in Ukraine. This phenomenon probably can be attributed to the fact that Ukrainians gave negative assessments regarding the recent regime while having higher nostalgic feelings towards the past communist regime. Also, Ukrainians have expressed low satisfaction with their country's political institutions, except for the presidency.

Finally, in the second part of the paper three theories are introduced that can explain democratic attitudes. With the help of these theories, stratification of democratic attitudes within Ukraine is also observed. Firstly, (1) basic demographic variables (ethnicity, age, gender, education and region) are used as exploratory variables. Secondly, (2) experiences with democracy are observed. And thirdly, (3) the role of information in support of democracy is introduced.

The dataset is provided by the GfK-group. There were representative surveys conducted between 1990/91 and 1999 in all the Visegrad countries (Ulram and Plasser 2001) and additionally in 2011 there were surveys in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia<sup>1</sup>. In Ukraine the same questions were asked in 1999 and 2014. Using these datasets, Ukrainian attitudes can be compared with the ones in the Visegrad countries and also perceptions are traced over time.

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<sup>1</sup> Since there is no available data about Czech Republic these three countries will be represent the Visegrad countries. From now on by Visegrad countries we will refer only to these three countries.




## 2. Democratic attitudes

Easton (1965) has distinguished two main pillars of democratic attitudes. On the one hand, he has introduced the concept of “diffuse support” which refers to a constant and long-term support of the political system. On the other hand, he has talked about “specific support” which refers to the concrete and short-term support (e.g. support of government or political parties).

Norris (1999) and Dalton (2003) have supplemented Easton’s categorization. They distinguish three main pillars of democratic values (See in Figure 1.). The first pillar is the acceptance of basic democratic values. The second pillar is the evaluation of the democratic performance. And the last and most specific pillar is the evaluation of political institutions.

**Figure 1: Pillars of democratic values (based on Norris’s (1999) and Dalton’s (2003) work)**



Norris and Dalton have argued that these three pillars are interrelated. Consequently, continuous dissatisfaction with the political system has a negative effect on the support of democracy. In contrast, Mishler and Rose (2002: 304) have argued that someone can be dissatisfied with the government or with the way that democracy works and still support democracy. In addition, poorly performing

political institutions can lead to dissatisfaction with democracy as well. In the following chapters, this paper deals with these three pillars separately.

## 2.1. Acceptance of basic democratic values

Under the acceptance of basic democratic values two main elements can be distinguished: (1) support of democracy and (2) support of alternative regimes. Linz and Stephan have argued that democratic regimes can be categorized as consolidated when *"a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from prodemocratic forces"* (Linz and Stephan 1996: 16).


The support of democracy is measured by asking whether the respondent prefers democracy to dictatorship or not <sup>2</sup> (See in Figure 2). In Ukraine the rate of people who prefer democracy to dictatorship does not lag behind the Visegrad countries. Moreover, this indicator is slightly better in Ukraine than in Slovakia. The concept of 'strongly antidemocrats' refers to those who prefer dictatorship to democracy. These rates show a similar pattern in Ukraine as in the Visegrad countries. Ukraine only differs from the reference countries in terms of the rate of people who answer with "Do not know". This result indicates that support of democracy is similar in Ukraine and the Visegrad countries.

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<sup>2</sup> V1: "On this sheet you will read several opinions on democracy and dictatorship. Which of these opinions do you agree with?"

- 1- Democracy is preferable to dictatorship under any circumstances.
- 2- In some cases, dictatorship may be preferable to democracy
- 3- For people like me, it makes no difference, whether we live in a democracy or a dictatorship
- 4- Don't know" (GfK 2014)


**Figure 2: Support of democracy in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



Despite the fact that recently Ukraine and the Visegrad countries do not differ a lot in terms of support of democracy, they have had very different trajectories in the last few decades. As several scholars have pointed out, the V4 countries had a successful transformation compared to the other post-socialist countries in the first decades after the fall of the Berlin wall. (Ágh Attila 2013; Fuchs 1993; Fuchs 2006; Hoffertbert and Klingemann 1999; Mishler and Rose 1996; Mishler and Rose 2002) However, the recent survey indicates that the democratic development has lost momentum in the V4 while Ukraine is catching up. As Figure 3 shows, since 1999 Slovakia and Hungary have experienced a moderate decline while Poland has seen some development in terms of support of democracy. In contrast, Ukrainian support of democracy has increased by 18 percent since 1999, while support of dictatorship has fallen by 16 percent. This result indicates that the recent relatively strong support of democracy in Ukraine has occurred in the last 15 years. (See the exact results in the Appendix).



**Figure 3: The change in support of democracy in the Visegrad countries (between 1999 and 2011) and in Ukraine (between 1999 and 2014) in percentage point**



A typology is used in order to gain deeper understanding of democratic orientations. Morlino, Linz and Stephan developed this indicator. It relies on two variables: (1) whether someone supports democracy<sup>3</sup> or not and (2) whether this person believes that democracy is capable of solving crucial problems in his or her country or not<sup>4</sup>. Based on this typology, four groups can be distinguished: (1) confident democrats who prefer democracy to dictatorship under any circumstances and also convinced that democracy is capable of dealing with problems. (2) Worried democrats who prefer democracy, however, have doubts about its problem solving capability. (3)

<sup>3</sup> V1: "On this sheet you will read several opinions on democracy and dictatorship. Which of these opinions do you agree with?"

- 1- Democracy is preferable to dictatorship under any circumstances.
- 2- In some cases, dictatorship may be preferable to democracy
- 3- For people like me, it makes no difference, whether we live in a democracy or a dictatorship
- 4- Don't know" (GfK 2014)

<sup>4</sup> V2: "Do you think democracy is capable of dealing with the problems our country faces?"

- 1- Yes, democracy is capable
- 2- No, democracy is not capable
- 3- Don't know "(GfK 2014)

Alienated individuals who are indifferent to the type of government and finally (4) authoritarians who prefer dictatorship over democracy. (See on Table 1.)


**Table 1: Operationalization of the typology made by Marilino, Linz and Stephan**

	Democracy is preferable to dictatorship under any circumstances	For people like me, it makes no difference, whether we live in a democracy or a dictatorship	In some cases, dictatorship may be preferable to democracy
Democracy is capable of dealing with the problems his or her country faces	Confident Democrats	Alienated	Authoritarian
Democracy is NOT capable of dealing with the problems his or her country faces	Worried Democrats		

This typology provides an opportunity to further observe the composition of society according to their democratic attitudes (See Figure 4). In the Visegrad countries ‘Confident Democrats’ constitute the absolute majority (66 percent in Hungary, 59 percent in Poland and 56% in Slovakia). In contrast, less than half of the respondents in Ukraine (47 percent) preferred democracy to dictatorship and believed that democracy is capable of dealing with the problems facing the country, however the rate of ‘Worried Democrats’ is remarkably high. 23% of the Ukrainians preferred democracy but did not believe that democracy is capable of dealing with the problems facing their country. The number of ‘Worried Democrats’ is so high in Ukraine that it outnumbers ‘Authoritarians’, whereas in the Visegrad countries the ‘Authoritarians’ constitute the second largest group after ‘Confident Democrats’. Thus the results indicate that Ukraine does not lag behind in terms of preferences for


democracy, however, one third of the democrats believe that democracy cannot deal with their problems.

**Figure 4: Typology about democratic orientation in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



Moreover, this typology can help us observe changing tendencies over time (See in Figure 5). As we can see, the rate of ‘Confident Democrats’ has risen in every observed country. The growth of this category in Ukraine actually slightly exceeds the Polish and the Slovak growth and only falls behind the Hungarian one. However, the Ukrainian change in rate of ‘Worried Democrats’ largely differs from the change which was measured in the Visegrad countries. In the Visegrad countries there has been a fall in this category (especially in case of Hungary), whereas, in Ukraine this category has risen by 11 percent. Therefore, in Ukraine, the above observed sharp increase in democrats is only partly caused by the rise in ‘Confident Democrats’, but also the rise in ‘Worried Democrats’ contributed to it. To sum up, the same tendencies can be recognized in the last 15 years in Ukraine as in the Visegrad countries, except that in Ukraine, while a growing number of people prefer democracy, many of them do not believe that it can solve crucial problems.

**Figure 5: The change in typology about democratic orientation in Visegrad countries (between 1999 and 2011) and in Ukraine (between 1999 and 2014) in percentage points**




It is also highly important whether citizens support multi-party systems,<sup>5</sup> since those countries that have only one party system are considered to be hybrid ‘authoritarian or delegative democracies’. This form of government is prevalent in Latin America and in some Asian countries. We can see that both in Ukraine and in the Visegrad countries the majority favors a multi-party system. However, according to this indicator we can see that Ukrainians embrace the idea of pluralism of parties less than the citizens of the Visegrad countries (as Figure 6 indicates). In Ukraine only 54% answered that they prefer multi-party system and 33% said that they prefer a one party system. Also the rate of people who answered ‘Do not know’ to this question was higher in the Ukraine than in the Visegrad countries.

<sup>5</sup> V3: “Do you think it is better for a country to have only one party, where there is a maximum of unity, or several parties, so that diverse views may be represented?”


1- Only one party  
 2- Several parties  
 3- Don’t know” (GfK 2014)

**Figure 6: Preferences for pluralism of party system in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



As we can see, Ukraine lags behind in terms of support of a multi-party system. Although in case of this quotation, changes over time are also worth observing (See in Figure 7). The support of a one party system has decreased in both the Visegrad countries and in Ukraine as well, but in the latter one this tendency is markedly stronger. In Ukraine the support of a one party system has fallen by 9 percent. By comparison, in Slovakia it has fallen only by 6%, in Poland by 3% and in Hungary by 3%. This result indicates that Ukrainians do not support a multi-party system as much as citizens of the Visegrad countries, but that the gap between them is narrowing.

**Figure 7: The change in rate of people who would prefer one party system to multi-party system in the Visegrad countries (between 1999 and 2011) and in Ukraine (between 1999 and 2014) in percentage point**




By using the above-analyzed indicators, a democracy index (from now on the index is going to be referred to as *Support of Democracy Index*) can now be calculated,<sup>6</sup> which implies more detailed questions about the support of democracy. This index

<sup>6</sup> The items are standardized and summed.

incorporates answers about whether someone prefers democracy to dictatorship, whether someone prefers a multi-party system to a one party system and how much he or she agrees on different statements<sup>7</sup>, which measure democratic orientations as well. A higher index translates into a stronger support of democracy by the respondent. According to this index, Ukrainians support democracy less than Hungarians and Polish people but Ukrainians have higher points in this index than Slovaks (See in Figure 8). This result supports the previous findings of this paper.

**Figure 8: Support of Democracy index in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



## 2.2. Evaluation of democratic performance

Satisfaction with democracy is one of the major components of democratic attitudes. Democracy is obviously in jeopardy if the majority of the citizens are not content with the political system. As such, a stable democracy requires a certain level of satisfaction. It is also important to note that satisfaction with democracy tends to be


<sup>7</sup> V6: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you fully agree, rather agree, rather disagree or completely disagree with the statement.

- 1- A viable democracy cannot be conceived without (the existence of) a political opposition
- 2- Everybody should have the right to express his or her opinion, even if the majority holds a different opinion
- 3- Every citizen has the right to take to the streets for his or her convictions, if necessary
- 4- In principle every democratic party should have the chance to come into power
- 5- The state should have the right to control the media to make sure that public order and morale are secured
- 6- We do not really need a parliament. Rather we need a strong leader who can make decisions quickly and implement them" (GfK 2014)

lower than the support of democracy since the previous concept refers to a more specific issue.

Ukrainian satisfaction with democracy in 2014 was compared to the Polish, Hungarian and Slovakian citizens' satisfaction in 2011<sup>8</sup> (See in Figure 9). Twenty-two percent of Ukrainians reported that they are very satisfied, along with 25% of Hungarians, 35% of Slovaks and 45% of the Polish population. The results show that the Ukrainians are slightly less satisfied than Hungarians, but they showed much lower levels of satisfaction than the Polish or the Slovak population. So the Ukrainians do not differ from the citizens of the Visegrad countries in terms of support of democracy, however, they reported lower satisfaction with democracy than the reference group. This result may explain the relative low level of 'Confident Democrats' in Ukraine.

**Figure 9: Satisfaction with democracy in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



A survey was conducted on the levels of satisfaction with democracy in 1999<sup>9</sup> as well. However this question was phrased slightly differently, so the comparison with

<sup>8</sup> V4. "What is your opinion about the way how democracy is working / functioning in „COUNTRY NAME“?"

- 1- Very satisfied
- 2- Rather satisfied
- 3- Rather not satisfied
- 4- Not at all satisfied
- 5- Don't know" (GfK 2014)


<sup>9</sup> „In general, are you satisfied with democracy and the whole political system?"

- 1- Very satisfied
- 2- Fairly satisfied
- 3- Not satisfied" (Ulam and Plaser 2001)

the most recent data is not possible. As such, only some observations can be made. As Figure 10 shows, in 1999 Ukraine dramatically fell behind the Visegrad countries in terms of satisfaction with democracy. During that time, the absolute majority of the citizens were very satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy in the Visegrad countries, whereas only 30% of Ukrainians responded the same way. Therefore, we can assume that the difference between the Visegrad countries and Ukraine has decreased in terms of satisfaction with democracy.

The fact that Ukraine has been catching up can be attributed to two reasons: (1) either this indicator has been decreasing in the Visegrad countries or (2) the Ukrainian indicator has been improving. The data of the European Value survey indicates that between 1999 and 2010 satisfaction with democracy increased in Poland and in Slovakia (however it decreased in Hungary). This result goes against the first possible explanation. Thus, the fact that Ukraine is catching up in terms of satisfaction with democracy probably means that in the last 15 years this indicator has improved in the country.

**Figure 10: In 1999 satisfaction with democracy in the Visegrad countries and in Ukraine**



The reliability of the question that measures satisfaction with democracy has been severely challenged on multiple occasions. Some scholars have argued that it is not clear whether the respondents were talking about the regime, the state or the government when they answered this question. Michler and Rose have pointed out that only political scientists are able to conceptually differentiate between regime and government, while the average citizen fails to fully comprehend the distinction



(Mischler and Rose 1996). Therefore, the evaluation of the democratic performance is highly connected to the evaluation of governmental performance.

Additionally, the concept of 'satisfaction with democracy' has been underpinned by problematic empirical results as well as concerns with its reliability. Ulram and Platzer (2001) have indicated that the level of democratic satisfaction in the Visegrad countries in certain periods was approximately the same as in Austria, despite the fact that the Visegrad countries were newly emerging democracies, whereas Austria had a well-established one. Their explanation for this result is similar to Mischler and Rose', they have argued that the problem with satisfaction with democracy is the ambiguous conceptualization. In the terminology of Easton's work, this indicator can fall under the category of both specific and the diffuse support.

By this logic, Rose et al (1998) argues that the evaluation of democracy is basically the comparison between the communist and the subsequent regime. The authors argue, that the people who are satisfied with democracy are the ones who prefer this regime to state socialism. Therefore the evaluation of the recent regime, the communist regime and the system change should also be analyzed.


The current regimes<sup>10</sup> in the respective countries have been perceived more negatively in Ukraine than the Visegrad countries. In Ukraine 38% of the citizens think that their state's policies almost always fail, whereas this rate is only between 17% and 23% in the Visegrad countries. (See in Figure 11)

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<sup>10</sup> V13."How often does it happen, that you have a feeling that Ukrainian politics are failing in important matters?"

- 1- (nearly) always
- 2- Often
- 3- Sometimes
- 4- Rarely
- 5- (nearly) never
- 6- Don't know" (GfK 2014)

**Figure 11: Rate of people who think that internal politics fails in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



Besides the perception of the recent regime, the assessment of the communist regime<sup>11</sup> is to be examined. In Figure 12 we can see that Ukrainians professed higher nostalgic feelings toward the communist regime than people from the Visegrad countries. Fifty-two percent of the Ukrainians reported that they had experienced or heard mostly good things about the communist regime, whereas in Poland only 13%, in Slovakia 31%, and in Hungary 36% of the citizens expressed positive memories towards the communist era. Similarly, Ukrainians attached more disappointment to the system change;<sup>12</sup> with Only 5% of the them having reported that the system change exceeded or largely fulfilled their personal expectations. These results are the same in Hungary, however, Polish and Slovaks had better experiences with the system change (10% of them said that system change exceeded or largely fulfilled their expectations). To sum up, Ukrainians had lower satisfaction with the recent

<sup>11</sup>V7: "How would you rate your experiences during the Soviet era? If you were under age please state what you have heard about it. Would you say that Soviet era in Ukraine had..."


- 1- Nearly only bad sides
- 2- More bad than good sides
- 3- Both good and bad sides
- 4- More good sides than bad sides
- 5- Nearly only good sides
- 6- Don't know" (GfK 2014)

<sup>12</sup>V8: "Approximately 25 years ago the old Soviet era in our country has been abolished. We live now in a democracy. Thinking about what you expected from the change of the political system, how would you evaluate the new political system? Would you say that your personal expectations have been...?"

- 1- Exceeded or largely fulfilled
- 2- Rather disappointed, I expected more
- 3- Seriously disappointed, none of my expectations have come true
- 4- Confirmed. I was right in never expecting any good to come out of it
- 5- Don't know" (GfK 2014)

government and they also expressed higher positive feelings toward the communist system. This result may explain the relatively low level of satisfaction with democracy.

**Figure 12: Evaluation of the communist system**



### 2.3. Evaluation of institutions

However, satisfaction with democracy suffers from blurred conceptualization, as the evaluation of institutions is unambiguously about specific support (See above in Easter's terminology). As this paper has shown in the previous chapter the observation of specific support is highly important in order to understand satisfaction with democracy as well, since citizens tend to equate democratic performance with the performance of political institutions. Trust in institutions<sup>13</sup> is one of the most widely used indicators of specific support.

Warren (1999) argues that the relationship between trust and democracy is ambiguous, sometimes even paradoxical. On the one hand, sometimes too much trust in the system replaces voting and suppresses conflicts of different opinions. For example, Hardoin (1999) has argued that people who support democracy should not trust the government since they are not fully aware of the relevant interests and circumstances. Moreover, he has argued that decline in trust is not a problem at all. It only means that the citizens are becoming more and more careful about where to place their trust. Also Inglehart (1997) argues that it is not the trust in the political

<sup>13</sup> V9: "In Ukraine there are various institutions. Please tell me how much trust you have in each of the following institutions using a scale from 1 to 7. 1 means that you have no trust in the institution, 7 means that you have complete trust.

system which determines stable democracies, but subjective well-being and interpersonal trust. He argues that reduced trust in institutions among citizens can signify the existence of a decreasingly trustworthy system, but it can also reflect that post-material values are spreading.

Furthermore, democracy requires a certain level of trust in order to produce a decent political life. Warren points out that *“from a strictly functional perspective, we might think of trust and democracy as a distinct but complementary way of making collective decision and organizing collective actions.”* (Warren 2001:4). For example, Offe (1996) has also argued that in modern societies “deficit of trust” generates a huge problem since citizens are more and more reliant on large-scale systems and only trust can solve numerous collective-action problems.

In Table 2 we can see that the average levels of trust in political institutions is slightly lower in Ukraine than in the Visegrad countries. This average in Ukraine (in 2014) was 26%, whereas it was between 31% and 36% in the observed Visegrad countries (in 2011). According to the literature this can mean one of two things: (1) the institutions are evaluated as less trustful in Ukraine (Offe’s theory) or (2) post-material values are less widespread in this country (Inglehart’s theory). Empirical results support the later statement. In Ukraine, a statistically significant number of more people expressed material values<sup>14</sup> than in the Visegrad countries. However, this finding does not go against the first explanation.

Ulam and Plasser (2001) have argued that in the case of certain institutions, high level of trust can be a sign of a low level of democratic consensus. Whereas in the case of other institutions, high levels of trust implies a more consolidated democracy.

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<sup>14</sup> v2e: *“What is your opinion concerning the following statements?”*

Security and welfare are more important than freedom.

- 1- fully agree
- 2- rather agree
- 3- neither-nor
- 4- rather disagree
- 5- fully agree” (GfK 2014)

They show that first and foremost we need to distinguish between, firstly, hierarchical and institutions of authority and secondly, institutions of political control. They argue that democracy becomes vulnerable if the citizens trust more in the previous institutions than in the latter one. However, this is not a problem in Ukraine at all. Only a small fractions of Ukrainians trust in institutions of authority compared to the Visegrad countries. For example, only 7% of the Ukrainians said that they trust the police, whereas the rate was between 34% and 42% in the Visegrad countries. This result may reflect the recent events and the role of the police in them. In other words, low level of trust in institutions may be harmful in terms of conducting collective-actions. The same problem arises with the court of law, which enjoys considerably less trust in Ukraine than in the Visegrad countries.

Moreover, Ulram and Plasser (2001) have pointed out that it also matters whether we observe non-competitive executive institutions or competitive ones. In Ukraine the evaluation of comparative executive institutions were much worse than in the Visegrad countries. For example, in Ukraine only 10% expressed trust in Parliament, whereas in the Visegrad countries this rate was 21-22%. Moreover, the non-competitive executive institutions enjoyed solid trust in Ukraine. 45% of the Ukrainians trusted in the President, which is higher than the rate in Hungary or in Poland.

Another problematic feature of Ukraine is the population's distrust towards the media. Although the media plays an important part in democratic consolidation, Ukrainians had a low level of trust in it. Trust in public television, private television and newspapers were observed. This paper has found that Ukraine falls behind the Visegrad countries in terms of trust in both of these institutions. In the Visegrad countries all types of media were evaluated badly except for private television. In contrast, Ukrainians found this type of media highly untrustworthy. Only 26% of Ukrainians trusted in the private media, whereas this rate was 42% in Hungary, 47% in Poland and 34% in Slovakia.

The only institution that enjoyed higher levels of trust in Ukraine than in the Visegrad countries was the church. Fifty percent of Ukrainians trust in the church, whereas this rate was only between 22% and 27% in the Visegrad countries.

**Table 2: Trust in Political institutions in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**

	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Ukraine
Government	23	19	23	23
Parliament	22	21	21	10
Political parties	12	11	14	9
President	30	40	51	45
Courts of law	38	40	28	6
Police	42	47	34	7
Army	38	58	53	46
Churches	22	27	27	50
Public Television	38	40	28	27
Private television	42	47	34	26
Newspapers	26	29	44	24
European Union	38	58	53	37
Average	31	36	34	26

### 3. Explanations of democratic attitudes

This section of the paper introduces three theories that explain democratic attitudes and tests them with the help of the Ukrainian dataset. Firstly, (1) the long-term, which focuses on primary socialization, will be introduced. Secondly, (2) short-term theories that imply temporary evaluation will be detailed (e.g. evaluation of the

government's work). And finally, (3) the learning theory emphasizes the importance of information gathering in addition to primary socialization and the evaluation of the current situation. Several research projects have found that short-term theories are better able to explain the support of democracy than long-term theories. However, they have also pointed out the emergence of a new generation that is more inclined towards democracy than the previous generation. (Voicu 2010; Preal 2010)

### 3.1. Long-term explanations

Long-term theories argue that democratic attitudes depend on primary socialization. Within primary socialization we can distinguish micro and macro factors. Micro factors entail, for example, age, gender, education, region and ethnicity. Macro factors were also analyzed, such as religious traditions (Huntington 1996), the length of communist regime (Fuchs 1999) and democratic experiences before the soviet regime (Pop-Eleches 2007). These explanations are focused on the environment in which the individuals have lived, assuming that if two people encountered similar circumstances, they would also have similar attitudes as well.

First of all the generational effect is tested. Empirical results show that in Ukraine, age has a significant effect on support of democracy.<sup>15</sup> The rate of people who prefer democracy over dictatorship was the highest among middle-aged people (64%), followed by the people who are below 26 years of age (60%), while the lowest rate was among people over 62 years (56%). At the same time, younger people have approximately the same likelihood to fall under the category of 'Confident Democrats'<sup>16,17</sup>. Moreover, younger people would less likely say that they prefer dictatorship to democracy. This means that the generation, which was born after the fall of the Berlin wall, supports democracy a bit less than their parents but they reject dictatorship more than the older generations. In contrast, in the Visegrad countries there are no significant differences between the generations. This result indicates

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<sup>15</sup> Chi Square test Sig.: 0.012

<sup>16</sup> Those people who prefer democracy over dictatorship and also believe that democracy is capable of dealing crucial problems (See in 2.1. chapter)

<sup>17</sup> Chi Square test Sig.: 0.043

that political socialization works slightly better in Ukraine than in the Visegrad countries over the last two decades.

**Table 3: Age effect on support of democracy (%)**

	Prefer democracy	Do not have any preference	Prefer dictatorship	Do not know
Younger than 26 years old	60	10	14	16
Between 26 and 62 years old	64	8	19	9
Older than 26 years old	56	16	19	10

Additionally, educational attainment has a strong effect on support of democracy<sup>18</sup>. We can see that the higher someone's educational level is, the more likely it is that this person would support democracy over dictatorship.

**Table 4: Education effect on support of democracy (%)**

	Prefer	Do not have	Prefer	Do not
Primary education	47	20	23	10
Secondary Academic	51	15	21	13
Secondary	63	10	15	12
Unfinished Higher	73	10	10	7
Higher	66	6	22	7

Gender also has significant effect on support of democracy<sup>19</sup>. Males tend to fall on either end of the political spectrum; with the group divided between support of democracy or dictatorship. However a significantly larger number of females answered that for them, the type of political system makes no difference or that they

<sup>18</sup> Chi Square test Sig.: 0.000

<sup>19</sup> Chi Square Test Sig.: 0.021



do not know the answer for this question. Evidently there is a gender gap in terms of articulation of political values.

Traditionally two parts of Ukraine can be distinguished: Eastern and Western Ukraine. The West is largely influenced by Poland while Russians have traditionally dominated the east of the country. However Miller et al. (2000) have found that support of democracy is related to the location in which an individual lives after controlling for education, religion and ethnicity in 1995.

Our data indicates that region has an effect on the support of democracy (without controlling for any other variables).<sup>20</sup> There is a sharp difference between the western and the eastern regions. Eighty-one percent of the people in the western region prefer democracy to dictatorship, which is actually much higher than in the Visegrad countries. In contrast, only 46% of the people living in the southern region and 53% of the people living in the eastern region expressed democratic attitudes. The rates in the northern and the central region fall in between the western and the eastern rates.

Moreover, the western regions exceed the eastern ones only in terms of the number of 'Confident Democrats'<sup>21</sup>, but the rate of 'Worried Democrats'<sup>22</sup> does not differ from one region to the other. This means that not only do western citizens prefer more democracy over dictatorship, but also in the west, people believe that democracy is more capable of dealing with the crucial problem of the country.

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<sup>20</sup> Chi Square Test Sig.: 0.000

<sup>21</sup> Chi Square Test Sig.: 0.000


<sup>22</sup> Chi Square Test Sig.: 0.130

**Table 5: In Ukraine the region effect on support of democracy in 2014 (%)**

	Prefer democracy	Do not have preferences	Prefer dictatorship	Do not know
Kyiv	61	11	18	10
Northern	70	6	14	11
Western	81	4	12	4
Central	61	11	18	11
Southern	46	23	20	11
Eastern	53	8	25	15

The Ukrainian regions largely differ in terms of ethnic composition. Western Ukraine is dominantly inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians, while ethnic Russians are concentrated in the eastern parts. (See in the Figure 13 which was made by Kaplan based on the CIA World Factbook 2001). Our data indicates the same sharp difference. In the western region 96% of the population said that they primarily speak Ukrainian, whereas in the eastern region it was only 3%.

**Figure 13: Percentage of Ukrainians identifying Russian as their native language<sup>23</sup>**



<sup>23</sup> Kaplan (2014)

Ethnicity also has an effect on the support of democracy.<sup>24</sup> Seventy percent of the people who speak mostly Ukrainian prefer democracy to dictatorship, whereas 58% of the Russian and 53% of the people who speak both Russians and Ukrainians expressed democratic attitudes. These ethnic differences in terms of support of democracy are highly prevalent in the recent conflict as well.

**Table 6: Ethnicity effect on support of democracy (%)**

	Prefer democracy	Do not have preferences	Prefer dictatorship	Do not know
Ukrainian	70	9	14	8
Russian	58	10	21	11
Speak both Ukrainian and Russian	53	12	22	13

To sum up, a two-dimensional analysis has shown that basic social variables significantly influence the support of democracy in Ukraine. Binary logistic regression is used to see how these explanatory variables simultaneously effect whether someone prefers democracy or not<sup>25</sup>. (See the detailed results in the Appendix). The multidimensional analysis shows that education remains significant even after controlling for age, ethnicity, region and gender. In terms of education the multivariate analysis shows the same results as the two-dimensional analysis. Therefore, the higher someone's educational level is, the more likely it is that this person will be supportive of democracy. Moreover, the binary logistic regression shows that people from western and northern regions are much more likely to express democratic attitudes even after controlling for basic demographic variables. However age, gender and ethnicity have become insignificant in the regression model.

<sup>24</sup> Chi Square Test Sig.: 0,003

<sup>25</sup> Model Sig.: 0.00 Nagerkerke R Square: 0.13

### 3.2. Short- term explanations

The second group of explanations emphasizes individuals' experiences. This theory says that support of democracy depends on short-term evaluation of democratic actors. This approach states that democratic attitudes are constantly changing (even within one generation). This change occurs every time the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the regime changes.

There are several ways to measure the efficiency of the system. Some theories emphasize the importance of economic development. Dalton (1994), for example, has argued that widespread support of democracy requires economic development. Besides that Michler and Rose (2002) have argued that efficiency of the democratic system also matters. For example, perceived existence of individual rights and freedoms are also able to affect the rates of support of democracy. Voicu (2005) has pointed out that the efficiency of the economy was more important in Central and Eastern Europe, whereas the efficiency of the democratic system had a stronger effect on the support of democracy in Western Europe.

The observed countries faced dramatic decline in their economies after the fall of the Berlin wall, which caused a decrease in their support of democracy. There are many people in the Visegrad countries that still blame democracy for the economic difficulties that their countries face, a quarter of a century after the change in political systems. Therefore, the observation of the effect of the economic situation on democratic attitudes is highly relevant.

We can see that the economic situation of the individual influences his or her democratic attitudes. The financial situation was measured by three questions. Firstly, we can see that (1) the actual economic situation<sup>26</sup> significantly affects the


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<sup>26</sup> D1: „What can you tell about financial status of your family?

1. We have to save on food
2. We have enough money for food, but have to borrow or collect money to buy clothes and footwear
3. We have enough money for food and necessary clothes and footwear, but have to borrow or collect money to buy such things as good suit, mobile phone, vacuum cleaner and the like.
4. We have enough money for food, clothes, footwear and other purchases but have to borrow or collect money to buy expensive goods (such as TV-set, refrigerator and the like).
5. We have enough money for food, clothes, footwear and expensive purchases but have to borrow or collect money to buy car or flat
6. We can make any purchases at any time
7. Hard to say (Not listed in the card)" (GfK 2014)

support of democracy.<sup>27</sup> There is a positive correlation between financial status and support of democracy. Secondly, by the help of the used dataset it is possible to observe (2) the perception of change in the financial situation<sup>28</sup> as well. Those people who experienced improvement in their financial status expressed stronger democratic attitudes. Sixty-six percent of those people who experienced a lot of improvement in their financial status expressed democratic attitudes. In contrast, only 58% of people who said that their financial situation is much worse than it used to be 10 years ago expressed preference to democracy over dictatorship. Finally, the effect of expected changes in financial status<sup>29</sup> is observed. As Figure 14 shows, those people who had the most democratic attitudes are the ones that expected improvement in their financial situation in the following 10 years. Binary logistic regression shows that expected future financial development has the strongest effect on support of democracy among these three economic variables. However, the actual financial situation remains significant even after controlling for expectation and experiences about the change in financial situation.

**Figure 14: The relationship between expected financial situation and democratic attitudes in Ukraine (2014)**



<sup>27</sup> Chi Square Test Sig.: 0.002

<sup>28</sup> V21: "Comparing the actual financial situation of your household to that of 10 years ago would you say that it was ..."

1. much better
2. somewhat better
3. the same
4. somewhat worse
5. much worse" (GfK 2014)

<sup>29</sup> V22: "And what do you think, how will be the financial situation of your household in 10 years?"

1. much better
2. somewhat better
3. the same
4. somewhat worse
5. much worse" (GfK 2014)

The dataset also makes it possible to observe perceptions as to whose duty it should be to guarantee welfare. Thirty-eight percent of people from the Visegrad countries thought that the state should be responsible for the welfare of its citizens, which is much higher than in Western countries. Sugatagi (2010) has argued that in the Visegrad countries the high level of dissatisfaction with the system change can be attributed to the fact that citizens think that the state is too weak. In Ukraine the state is considered to be responsible for welfare to an even higher degree than in the Visegrad countries. Fifty-six percent of Ukrainians think that the state should be responsible for everyone's economic security. Besides that, those people who think that the state should be responsible to guarantee welfare tend to be more antidemocratic than those who believe that individuals should be responsible for their own welfare.<sup>30</sup>

As we have seen, some scholars argue that efficiency of the democratic system also matters in support of democratic attitudes. The recent dataset makes it possible to observe to what degree the respondents think that certain individual rights exist in Ukraine<sup>31</sup>. With the help of these items, an index was calculated<sup>32</sup>. This index took a greater value if someone believes to a higher level that individual rights do not exist in Ukraine. Those people who had higher value in this index tend to have lower support of democracy as well.<sup>33</sup> This result indicates that perceived efficiency of the democratic system correlates with higher support of democracy.

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<sup>30</sup> Chi Square Sig: 0.001

<sup>31</sup> V16. "To what extent do you agree that the following rights and freedoms exist for citizens in Ukraine?"

- A - Right to elect authorities
  - B - Right to establish public associations
  - C - Equal rights of national minorities
  - D - Equality of women's rights
  - E - Right to freedom of religion
  - F - Right to freedom of speech
  - G - Right to fair court proceedings
  - H - Right to participate in meetings, demonstrations of protest
  - I - Right to be protected from unlawful actions
  - J - Right to be protected from self-will of representatives of power
1. Fully agree
  2. Rather agree
  3. Rather disagree
  4. Completely disagree
  5. Don't know" (GfK 2014)

<sup>32</sup> The items were standardized and summed.


<sup>33</sup> ANOVA Sig.: 0.049

### 3.3. Learning theory

Besides the long-term explanation and the short-term explanation a new theory has emerged to explain the varying support of democracy. The previous theories observe the role of primary socialization and personal experience in democratic attitudes. However, it has been shown that information can also play a crucial role in the formation of democratic attitudes. For example, Fuchs (2006) has argued that the spread of information through media played a crucial role in the crash of state socialism.


Therefore, understanding politics plays an important role in supporting democracy. In Figure 15 we can see that a lower rate of Ukrainians said that they sometimes do not understand politics, which is a higher rate than in the Visegrad countries. In the Visegrad countries approximately 75% of the people had some problem with understanding politics, whereas this rate was only 59% in Ukraine.

**Figure 15: Rate of people who sometimes have problem with understanding politics in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**




Moreover, in Ukraine, the number of people who said that they understand the problems of their own country was higher than the number of people in the Visegrad countries (as we can see it in Figure 16). Therefore, internal affairs within politics are more understandable for Ukrainians than for the citizens from Visegrad countries.

**Figure 16: Rate of people who think that they understand their countries problem in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



Besides the fact that Ukrainians claim to understand more politics than the citizens of the Visegrad countries, they are also more interested in politics (See in Figure 17). In Ukraine 37% of the people said that they are very much or much interested in politics, whereas only 23% of Hungarians 12% of Polish people and 9% of Slovaks expressed such a strong interest in politics. Again the high interest in politics among Ukrainians may be the consequence of the recent turbulent political situation in the country.

**Figure 17: Interest in Politic in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**




Feelings toward politics were also mapped. As Figure 18 shows, in Ukraine, the most frequent feeling toward politics was anger, distrust and disgust. In contrast, in the Visegrad countries, distrust is the leading feeling. In average, 45% of people from the Visegrad countries mentioned distrust, whereas only 24% of the Ukrainians felt this way. There is also a remarkable difference in terms of sympathy for politics. Ukrainians had much more sympathy for politics than the citizens from the Visegrad countries. Eleven percent of Ukrainians felt sympathy for politics, whereas only 6% of





Polish people, 3% of Slovaks and 1% of Hungarians felt the same. Moreover, Ukrainian people felt much less indifference than people from the Visegrad countries. Only 13 % of the Ukrainians felt this way, whereas 30% of Hungarians, 28% of the Slovak people and 21% of the Polish people expressed this feeling. This result also shows that politics evokes less negative feelings and more positive feelings in Ukraine than in the Visegrad countries. However, as Figure 18 shows dominantly negative feelings are attached to politics in Ukraine as well.

**Figure 18: Feelings evoked by politics in Ukraine (2014)**




The learning theory claims that attention should be paid not only to the primary socialization, but also to the socialization that occurs later in life. Mainly two forms of political participation can be distinguished. The first is (1) voting in elections. The second one is (2) ‘civil engagement’ which contains all political activity that goes beyond voting.

According to the IDRE data (2014) the Ukrainian voter turnout for parliamentary elections is on the same level as the turnout in the Visegrad countries (See the detailed data in the Appendix). Therefore, there is no big difference between the Visegrad countries and Ukraine in terms of the number of voters participating in the election. However in both of these countries a decreasing tendency over time can be traced. In Ukraine every parliamentary election has had fewer and fewer participants than in the previous years. In 1994 76% of the population voted, whereas in 2012 only 57% of the population expressed their point of view through voting.

At the same time Ukrainians found the parliamentary elections extremely important compared to the citizens of the Visegrad countries. Forty-one percent of Ukrainians said that parliamentary elections were very important to them, whereas only 36% of the Hungarians, 29% of the Slovaks and 26% of Polish people shared this opinion (See in Figure 19). Meanwhile the rate of people who are not interested in parliamentary elections was approximately the same in Ukraine and in the Visegrad countries. To sum up, parliamentary elections have a solid support in Ukraine.


**Figure 19: Citizens opinion about importance of parliamentary elections in the Visegrad countries (2011) and Ukraine (2014)**



The second field of political participation is civil engagement. Bratten and Mittes (2004) have argued that different political and cultural institutions can shape public opinion. For example, churches, political parties and civil organizations can have a huge impact on individuals. Several scholars have argued that a strong civil organization is the key to a good working democracy (Putman 1995, Tocqueville 1838).

In Ukraine, an extremely low number of people think that elections are the only way to influence politics compared to the Visegrad countries (See in Figure 20). Only 57% of the Ukrainians think this way, however, the rate is between 68% and 74% in the Visegrad countries. This result shows that Ukrainians' idea about democracy is not limited to only participating in elections. However, there is no data to further observe the type of activities that they can imagine as a tool to influence politics. This result may also be the consequence of the ongoing events in Ukraine. For example, the demonstrations did have an effect on recent politics.

**Figure 20: Rate of people who think that elections are the only way to influence politics in the Visegrad countries (2011) and in Ukraine (2014)**



#### 4. Conclusion

The present paper observes Ukrainian democratic attitudes. The research focus is two-fold. On the one hand, democratic attitudes in Ukraine are described. On the other hand, this paper introduces three possible theories that can explain the democratic attitudes in Ukraine (namely long-term explanation, short-term explanation and learning theory).

In the first section of this paper democratic attitudes are described. Firstly, Ukrainian attitudes are compared to the citizens' opinion in the Visegrad countries. And secondly, Ukrainian tendencies over time are observed. The results indicate that the Ukrainian support of democracy does not lag behind the Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak ones. In the beginning of the 21th century the difference between Ukraine and the Visegrad countries were significant, but ever since then, the gap between them has narrowed. However, the rate of 'Worried Democrats', those people who prefer democracy but do not think that it is capable of dealing with the crucial problems of the country, was remarkably high in Ukraine compared to the Visegrad countries.

Moreover, satisfaction with democracy is much lower in Ukraine than in the reference countries. Several scholars have argued that citizens cannot distinguish the difference between the political system and the regime. As such the low level of satisfaction with democracy can be attributed to the fact that Ukrainians give poor evaluations of the recent regime but have higher nostalgic feelings toward the communist regime.



On average, Ukrainians have lower trust in political institutions than citizens from the Visegrad countries. Ukrainians have quite a low level of trust in the police, court of law, competitive political institutions and media but they have relatively high level of trust in presidents and churches. Based on Ulram and Plasser's (2001) argument, this result may endanger the democratic consolidation.

In the second section of this paper three theories are introduced in order to explain democratic values in Ukraine. Firstly, the long-term theory is observed. This approach says that democratic attitudes depend on primary socialization, which means that it could take a generation to change attitudes. By the help of this theory it has been shown that the people who are more supportive of democracy were born in the socialist era, better educated, male and live in the western regions of the country.

The second theory says that experiences are also able to shape democratic attitudes. Consequently attitudes could change within generation if the efficiency of the system would change. In this paper, financial and democratic efficiency is observed. This paper shows that wealthier Ukrainians are actually more democratic. Moreover, those people who think that freedom and individual rights work well in their country are actually more democratic than those who doubt it.

And finally the learning theory argues that information can play a crucial role in formulation of democratic attitudes. This paper shows that the Ukrainians are very much interested in politics. For them, parliamentary elections are more important than it is for the citizens from the Visegrad countries. And at the same time they do not narrow citizens' opportunity to influence politics strictly through voting. This vibrant interest and participation can be attributed to the ongoing events in Ukraine but it is also able to have a positive effect on democratic consolidation.

## Appendix

**Table 7: Support of democracy over dictatorship in Visegrad countries (2011, 1999, 1991) and in Ukraine (2014, 1999) (%)**

	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Ukraine
Democracy is preferable to dictatorship under any circumstances				
2011	70	66	62	62
1999	71	61	64	44
1991	69	60	67	
In some cases, dictatorship may be preferable to democracy				
2011	11	17	20	18
1999	16	10	15	34
1991	9	14	10	
For people like me, it makes no difference, whether we live in a democracy or a dictatorship				
2011	14	11	14	10
1999	12	27	21	21
1991	18	23	22	

**Table 8: Typology about democratic orientation in the Visegrad countries (2011, 1999) and in Ukraine (2014, 1999)**

	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Ukraine
<b>Confident Democrats</b>				
2011	66	59	56	47
1999	47	48	46	32
<b>Worried Democrats</b>				
2011	9	12	8	23
1999	25	14	18	12
<b>Alienated</b>				
2011	13	11	14	9
1999	16	27	21	21
<b>Authoritarians</b>				
2011	12	18	22	22
1999	13	10	15	34

**Table 9: Preferences for one party system in Visegrad countries (2011, 1999) and in Ukraine (2014, 1999) in percentage**

	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Ukraine
2011	16	20	20	33
1999	22	23	24	42

**Table 10: Typology about democratic orientation in the Visegrad countries (2011, 1999) and in Ukraine (2014, 1999)**

	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Ukraine
<b>Confident Democrats</b>				
2011	47	54	55	50
1999	47	48	46	32
<b>Worried Democrats</b>				
2011	27	15	7	16
1999	25	14	18	12
<b>Alienated</b>				
2011	15	13	16	12
1999	16	27	21	21
<b>Authoritarians</b>				
2011	12	18	22	22
1999	13	10	15	34



**Table 11: Table: Binary Logistic regression to explain democratic attitudes<sup>34</sup>**

Age	
Below 25	(R)
Between 26 and 62	1.18
Above 63	0.99
Gender	
Male	(R)
Female	0.31
Education	***
Primary	(R)
Secondary Academic	1.14
Secondary Vocational	2.07 *
Unfinished higher	3.57 **
Higher	2.44 **
Ethnicity	
Ukrainian	(R)
Russian	1.27
Both Russian and Ukrainian	0.87
Region	
Kyiv	(R)
Northern	1.95 **
Western	3.67 ***
Central	1.26
Southern	0.65
Eastern	0.72

<sup>34</sup> Sig. <0.1=\*; Sig. < 0.05= \*\*; Sig. < 0.001=\*\*\*

**Table 12: Satisfaction with the system change in the Visegrad countries (2011, 1999) and in Ukraine (2014, 1999)**

	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Ukraine
Exceeded or largely fulfilled				
2011 <sup>35</sup>	5	10	10	4
1999	23	26	18	4
1991	18	28	17	
Rather disappointed, I expected more				
2011 <sup>36</sup>	55	51	51	41
1999	51	43	46	40
1991	56	41	56	
Seriously disappointed, none of my expectations have come true				
2011 <sup>37</sup>	26	19	18	29
1999	15	18	21	36
1991	19	19	19	
Confirmed. I was right in never expecting any good to come o				
2011 <sup>38</sup>	13	5	9	8
1999	11	11	13	17
1991	14	10	8	
Don't know				
2011 <sup>39</sup>		15	13	16
1999	-	2	2	3
1991	2	2	1	

<sup>35</sup> In case of Ukraine: 2014

<sup>36</sup> In case of Ukraine: 2014

<sup>37</sup> In case of Ukraine: 2014

<sup>38</sup> In case of Ukraine: 2014

<sup>39</sup> In case of Ukraine: 2014

**Voting turnout of parliamentary election in the Visegrad countries and in Ukraine  
between 1989 and 2013 (%)**

	Hungary	Poland	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Ukraine
1989	-	62.1	-	-	-
1990	44.1	-	96.3	96.3	-
1991	-	43.2	-	-	-
1992	-	-	84.7	84.7	-
1993	-	52.1	-	-	-
1994	55.1	-	-	75.4	75.81
1995	-	-	-	-	-
1996	-	-	76.3	-	-
1997	-	47.9	-	-	-
1998	57.0	-	74.0	84.2	70.65
1999	-	-	-	-	-
2000	-	-	-	-	-
2001	-	46.1	-	-	-
2002	70.5	-	58.0	70.1	69.24
2003	-	-	-	-	-
2004	-	-	-	-	-
2005	-	40.6	-	-	-
2006	67.6	-	64.5	54.7	67.12
2007	-	53.9	-	-	62.03
2008	-	-	-	-	-
2009	-	-	-	-	-
2010	64.4	-	62.6	58.4	-
2011	-	48.9	-	-	-
2012	-	-	-	59.1	57.4
2013	-	-	59.5	-	-



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