The foundation for such turn lies in the common past of authoritarian leadership, and anti-elitist and anti globalist sentiment. Even though the V4 since the Soviet area has advanced tremendously in establishing liberal democracies, trust amongst the population has deteriorated as wealth and social prosperity remained limited to a few. The revelation that in a globalised world, it is not possible for all the population to be the winners of the system, losers become the voice above the noise. The growing discontent of the population, underpinned by blame towards EU bureaucracy is a great contributor to the rise of populism and anti-establishment sentiment.

Populism is a political rhetoric used to please the people, tell them what they want to hear - instead of what they should think about - in order to attract as many votes as possible. This type of speech, for it to be effective, has to be specific and has to be able to react precisely to the masses. For this, political candidates cannot be ideologically committed but generalist. This leaves political figures without the need to develop concrete economic or social policy through which they make their arguments. Without concrete agendas, elections - in a multiparty populistic system - become competitions between charismatic leaders who are limited to demagogy and simple talk, even vulgarism. Political debate is fueled by emotion rather than reason. As gloomy as this may sound, reasons for it cannot be neglected and must be viewed from domestic as well as international perspective.

As the Soviet Union disintegrated, independent nations - most of which that has been under foreign rule for centuries - have emerged as sovereign entities. Political agenda was developed in the lines of EU accession where the goal was to privatize the economy and liberate the people. As newly elected governments responsible for the management of this transition, in order to better leverage their negotiations, were greatly committed to such tasks. What governments did not consider when adhering to EU social legislations, is decades of authoritarian, ultraconservative social policy that the Communist regime dictated. The social fabric, hardly able to adopt at such speed, was neglected and to a certain degree, frustrated with the liberal rights. This however, remained under the rug through the years of negotiating EU accession. Frustration was further provoked by the emerging corruption scandals, that took place during the process of privatization where many ex party affiliates were given ownership of former state owned businesses. Such scandals and the social shock of the population is what lead to the disintegration of pro EU liberal parties in the mid 90s with the intercession of political parties that developed their rhetoric to foster such dissatisfaction. Once the locals were reassured in their own “identity”, newly elected governments were able to develop along the lines of a mixture of right wing conservative social morality and a leftist approach to an open economy. With this, a lack of definite political agenda, populism remains the valid tool for political opponents. After EU accession, politics of the Visegrad nations was left without a solid goal, “there was nothing to achieve, nothing to make a solid effort for”, and an “agenda vacuum” has emerged. Having though, a population that as a post socialist society still carries legacy of anti-establishment, anti-elitist and somewhat nationalistic and xenophobic views, leading populist coalitions were able to formulate their rhetoric against the EU. As the V4 nations experienced discontent with the democratic and bureaucratic institutions, populist rhetoric against it was pioneered by Hungarian PM Viktor Orban.

Claiming that illiberal democracy was the democratic answer to a liberal autocracy, Mr Orban gained wide support from leaders of the Visegrad countries. It is now a great concern of the European project, that populist politics, that claim to reintroduce democracy into the european policy making are deliberately slowing down the process to make their argument. The goal would be to renationalize certain aspects of society such as judiciary the banking system, social policy making, and integration. We find recent developments in Poland and Hungary, where much of the judiciary system, the media, intelligence services were packed with supporters of Orbans` and the Kachinskys government. These attempts to centralize the state are considered to be protectionist moves from further influence of the EU. One can chose to interpret this form a domestic perspective as not protection, but limitation of the functioning of democratic institutions which are necessary to foster an independent civil society. Regardless of the perspective, these events have an adverse effect on European integration because they slow down the process, and while the attempt to redefine democracy may be valid, it goes against the initial goal of the project. Having national interest define international politics was what lead to WWII, reintroducing that as dominant factor may turn back the clock of the future of Europe.

While populists gained just 12.5% of the vote at the previous EU parliamentary elections, these numbers have remained relatively stable since the 80s. However, there is a growing concern for great reason. As the Visegrad nations jointly oppose to take any migrants from the Middle East, it provides ground for their conservative-populist governments to collaborate. If this collaboration should trickle into the EU decision-making process, it could speed up the process of disintegration. And as the EU may propose to withdraw funding as retribution for not taking any refugees, further frustration against the western establishment will be used by populist to gain further voter support. This in itself is still no substantial threat to the Union, however, as the flow of refugees is not likely to halt, Romania and Bulgaria may also decide to join with the populists of the V4. Finding an EU level solution for the migrant crisis, with such growing opposition, will become even more difficult.

On another note, in Hungary for example, the continuous fuling of public discontent in the past thirty years, has built a class of outraged citizens. Support of the radical, xenophobic, nationalist, anti EU, Movement for a Better Hungary party (Jobbik) is at an all time high. As it usually is the case for radical parties, once elected they tone down and became more moderate, but they do originate from burning EU flags at public speeches and patrolling, with their own National Guard, areas populated by gypsies... Supporters of Jobbik on the one hand are mostly young, educated and motivated to make a change. On the other hand they are the most dissatisfied who have very low involvement in politics and very low trust towards established power. Jobbik is, with having an approximate 12%-16% of support, the only real opposition of Orban's Fidesz government. As populist rhetoric of Jobbik points to the problems with the Fidesz`s establishment, its corruption, cronyism, lack of transparency and reason for much of the population being left behind, validity of the party continuously grows. As speculative as this may seem, having radicalism of such gain momentum on the long run, is what could become the last nail in the coffin for the liberal democratic project of Europe.

As nationalism still constructs domestic identity amongst the Visegrad countries, the European project should consider a mixed paradigm in which democracy may manifest in alternative forms. If nationals of the V4 fear that EU liberal democracy undermines domestic identity, independent civil society and grassroot organizations should be supported greatly in those states. Having a strong civil society not only fits with the EU established liberal values, but it should be a key component in any political environment. Especially, if populists thrive to maintain integrity in challenging European democracy should they foster and empower the voices of their populations.

As we understand populism as that which exists as a reaction to the will of the people, it also carries great risk. While society becomes addicted to the populist leader, a figure who carries the answers through the illusion of power, the will to understand democracy, to stand up for individual rights or to participate in fair elections may deteriorate. The question is, what incentive lies behind the will to manage, perhaps alter the direction of such perceptions and by whom will the legitimacy to make that choice be given?